

a. 513!
Man in Paradise:

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OR, A

Philosophical Discourse

vindicating

The Soul's Prerogative

in discerning the

TRUTHS

OF

CHRISTIAN RELIGION

with the EYE of

REASON.



Banworth

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Man in Paradise.



Such is the excellency and original of Man's Soul, brooded and hatched by the all-enlivening breath of God, fashioned by Divine artifice after the Idea and most perfect exemplar, conceived first in the minde of God, whose architype it doth faithfully resemble: such, I say, is its excellency and noble extraction, that the contemplation hereof

cannot chuse but heighten our serious thoughts into admiration, and translate the considerate minde into an extasie. For whatsoever excellencies the Great Monarch of Heaven and Earth hath scattered and diffused amongst the lower species and degrees of creatures; all these hath he concentrated, collected, and moulden together in mans Soul; that by union, whose property it is alwayes to add virtue and efficacy to the things united, they might become more perfect here, then in the creatures singly, and, *κατ' ὑπεροχὴν*, super-excellent.

The natural abilities, which are the meanest of the Souls endowments, and

as

as it were, the dregs of all the rest, what lustre and splendor do they shew in their sweet harmony, order, disposition, and sufficiency to attain the end for which they were bestowed?

No sooner hath the Embryon all its parts and Organs woven of fine spermatical threeds, by the industry of the plastick or formative virtue, but it receives from this divine particle of Air, *vim nutritivam*, a nutritive faculty, to maintain the substance then begun: *vim auctricem*, an augmentative power, to encrease and bring it to a just quantity and bulk, that the Palace wherein this noble Prince, the Soul, is to reside

side, may be compleatly built, and furnished with necessities fit to entertain so great a Majesty.

These powers have other subordinate faculties, as careful and thrifty Handmaids, waiting upon them; wherein you may see the oeconomy of a well-ordered house. There is an attractive faculty, as a hand, to pull nourishment in; and a retentive, to keep carefully what is gotten. A concoctive, to fit and prepare what is so retained, for the use of the whole body; which concoctive hath also a distributive faculty, as another subordinate Handmaid under her, whereby there is performed a just *anadosis*, or distribution of
mat-

matter to each several part according to its particular exigency. And under all these, there is an expulsive faculty, which serves as a drudge to carry out of the body the feculent part, or *excrementum*, wherein there is no convenient chyle remaining; as also, to make way for new matter to be contained, and then concocted, as was the former.

Thus have we that pattern and Idea which all well-ordered Families, and well-composed Commonwealths do imitate and follow.

Yet notwithstanding, the fabrick of man thus kept, would in time decay, and the species utterly perish,

B unless

unless to prevent this, a generative power were also implanted in him. In this the Philosopher acknowledgeth; *or* ~~is it~~ a Spice of Divinity, an emanation of whose eternal continuance, Nature, whose strength cannot maintain a solitary ~~and will~~ *endure* to eternity, by this help preserveth the specifical unity, and so compleateth her desire.

Here I would ask, With what curious Pencil this plastick power draws forth the lineaments & features of that body whose structure drew the Psalmist into such admiration? *Wonderful* ~~hast thou made me behind and before.~~ With whom doth it consult, to assign a due station and place for every mem-

member, leaving no chasme
or gap unfilled, and super-
adding nothing superfluous
or in vain? what *Euclide*-
or *Master - Geometridian*
doth it ask counsel of, to
give a fit proportion, a just
dimension, and perfect Fi-
gure to every part? by what
Arithmetick doth it count
the number of the parts,
and then by certain para-
lellisms of extuberances be-
hinde and before, doth so
counterpoise the whole
body, that the countenance
of man, and onely man,
may be directed towards
Heaven; there to behold
his image as in a glasse;
whilst all other Creatures
look prone upon the Earth;
out of which their earthly
souls were first extracted?

*Pronaq, cum spectent anima-
lia cetera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit: ca-
lumq, tueri
Fussit, & erectos ad sidera
tollere vultus.*

The sensitive faculties are sublimed to a higher pitch, and may elevate our minds to a higher degree of admiration. Who cannot but wonder at the swiftness of the sensible species posting with all speed to the sense, and the quickness and readiness of the sense to receive it? here you may see a vast mountain in a moment of time, contracted into a small model, and dwelling in an angle and corner of the eye. Who can-

cannot but admire the
faithfulness of the sensitive
Organs? who no sooner
receive, but transmit their
respective species, sending
them immediately to the
common sense, as into some
Common - council-house,
where the busie imaginati-
on, by spelling, joyning,
and compounding them to-
gether, reads a Lecture to
the appetite to prove its as-
sent or dissent, whilst o-
ther species are command-
ed to their Cells, and re-
serv'd in the store-house of
memory till need require
them? Look back, and you
may see the pellucid coars
wherewith the eyes are co-
vered, the clear waters
wherewith they are be-
dew'd, the winding laby-

rinth wherein the sound
 received into the ear must
 wander, till, beating upon
 that drum-like membrain
 which through the ingenite
 Air propagates the conti-
 nued sound, the sense, by a
παραμυθία, interceding, is
 married to the object: look
 forward, and you shall see
 the appetite no sooner a-
 waked, but the locomotive
 faculty, a most obedient
 servant, puts the decree in
 execution; earnestly pro-
 secuting that good, or fly-
 ing that evil, which the af-
 fection for that time pre-
 sident shall dispose unto.
 In the mean time the pas-
 sions, as love, joy, hope,
 anger, fear, grief, &c. as
 Hand-maids, are subservi-
 ent, according as they are
 re-

respectively concerned in the object apprehended, whether good or evil, past, present, or to come. In this sweet agreement, we may compare man's Soul to an artificial Lute, and these to be the strings of it; upon which it playes such ravishing Tunes, as would drive the considerate ear to an astonishment or plain extasie. *Anima creaturarum inferiorum compendium: centrum in quod omnes perfectionū linea concurrunt: speculum in quo suam quoque creatura faciem, sed longē pulchriorem, contempletur: eccho mirabilis, quæ solitarias nuda s̄q̄ voces à creaturis, aliis sigillatim expressas, multiplicato & suaviori sono refert.* The Soul is an abstract of
 in

inferiour creatures: a centre wherein all the lines of perfections meet: a glass wherein each creature may behold its face, but much fairer: an admirable eccho which carries back the naked and solitary voices of other creatures, by them singly express'd, in a multiplied and sweeter sound.

But what are all these, compared with the rational powers of the Soul? what is the sense, which traffiques onely with gross bodies, and quailities from thence emergent, compared with reason, by which the Soul negotiates with Angels and immateriate beings, and by metaphysical and and abstruse notions, wings it self up into the arms of him

him who breath'd it first
into the body of man ?

In this upper room and
higher loft of the Soul's re-
sidence, we may contem-
plate the Soul, as a Mo-
narch, wisely restraining or
giving liberty to the mis-
understanding affections
according to the rule of
right reason. Here have
we man ruling in man,
dressing and cultivating
man, as another Paradise,
wherein is all possible va-
riety, yet no confusion, no
anarchy or disorder, no pas-
sions contradicting one a-
nother, or tyrannizing o-
ver reason; no disturbance
of minde, no distemper of
body, but a most admirable
harmony of all things in
the whole universe of man.

Rea-

Reason is that Sceptre whereby the Soul doth rule without tyranny, the will and affections. Reason is that rod wherewith the Soul is kept in awe to obey without servile fear, the great Monarch of Heaven and Earth.

By reason, the Soul discerns that there is a God; drawing one Argument from the Creation of the World, which either did exist of it self, or was produced by another: but it could not give a being to it self, seeing that it is repugnant that any thing should be the cause of it self. Therefore the consequence is necessary, that the World was made by another; and; such another,

as was the efficient cause thereof; not produced by any other former efficient cause, but was of himself, and by himself from eternity: which can be no other but God.

Another Argument the Soul draws from the necessary dependence of a finite being upon an infinite: for every thing in the World is finite, both in respect of its essence and efficacy. Now every thing that is finite must necessarily be limited by another, seeing it is impossible that any thing should give bounds to it self: and there being not in things finite a progress to infinity, we must at length come to some certain being which is not li-

limited by another, but is of it self essentially and virtually infinite: which can be no other but God.

A third Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependence of a secondary cause upon a first: for unless we do here also grant a progress to infinity, which is absurd; in ascending the scale of subordination of causes, we must at length meet with one primary both efficient and final cause, having no other cause superiour or before it; which is only God.

A fourth Demonstration is taken from the necessary dependance of a contingent and temporal being, upon

upon an absolutely necessary and eternal being: for that which is temporal and contingent, was not alwayes, but commenced in time, and had a beginning of its duration. Wherefore seeing it is absurd, to grant that there was once nothing, and that which afterwards was, gave unto it self a beginning to be; we must conclude, that there was alwayes an absolutely necessary, and eternal being without all beginning; which is onely God.

A fifth Argument the Soul useth to prove a Deity, is the necessary dependance of all things that are good in an inferior order, upon some
C pri-

primary and chief good: for we see amongst all things in the world which are good, some are more, and others less good. Now seeing that all things are such more or less, according as they do more or less participate of that which is most of all such; it follows from hence, that there must necessarily be some Fountain of good, from whence all other goods do flow, as offsprings thereof; by which they are also measured: and this can be none other then onely God.

Not onely these, but many other rational Arguments the soul useth, to satisfie her self fully in this Truth; as, the general consent

sent of all people and Nations; the dictate of Conscience, when there is none to accuse; the goodly fabrick of the world; and, the continued Order of all things preserv'd in their first station, through all the vicissitude of generation and corruption; intimating a wise Rector and Governour upon whose nod and direction all things depend.

No sooner doth the Soul by such-like Arguments thorowly convince herself that there is a God, but this heavenly creature, wing'd with Reason, soars yet higher, endeavouring to see God's face, and to know what God is. Here she approaches: but such

C 2 is

is the transcendent splendour of his bright Majesty, that she judgeth it impossible to look God in the face, or to know *a priori* what God is, as Cicero saith in his first Book *De naturæ Deorum*, under the person of Cotta: *Rogas me quis & qualis sit Deus: auctore utar Simonide, de quo cum quaesivisset hoc idem tyrannus Hiero, deliberandi causa sibi unum diem postulavit: cum idem ex eo postridie quereretur, biduum petiit. Cum sepius duplicaret numerum dierum, admiransq; Hiero, quereretur cur ita faceret? Quia, inquit, quanto diutius considero, tanto mihi res obscurior videtur.* You ask me who and what is God: I will use the speech of Simonide.

monides, who, when King *Hiero* asked him the same question, desired a days time to deliberate concerning it. The day after, when he asked him again, he desired two days. Having in this manner divers times doubled the number of days, *Hiero* wondring at him, asked, Wherefore he did so? Because, saith he, the longer time I take to consider upon this matter, the more obscure it appears unto me. And indeed, those Arguments are infallible which are usually brought for this Opinion, *viz.* that it is impossible for the Soul to know God *a priori*.

Yet though she cannot see his face, she hath leave

granted her to behold his back-parts: though she cannot strictly define the Deity, yet she may in some manner describe it: though she cannot attain to any knowledge of God by fetching Arguments *a priori ad posterius*, from that which went before to that which follows after, from the cause to the effect, from that which is insensible to that which is sensible; yet she may argue *a posteriori ad prius*, from that which follows after to that which went before, from that which is corporeal to that which is incorporeal, from that which is compound to that which is simple, from that which is temporal to that which is eternal, from that which

which is finite to that which is infinite, from that which is natural to that which is supernatural, from the effect to the first efficient cause. By this way of argumentation the Soul makes a description of the Godhead, and, either by way of negation or transcendence, attributes that unto God, which can in no wise, without absurdity, be attributed to any of the creatures: as, that he is *actus purus*, a pure act, without all potentiality; *simplicissimus*, most simple, without all composition; *foelicissimus*, most happy: with many other. The very Heathen Philosophers, as *Cicero*, *Aristotle*, and *Plato*, by the onely light of nature,

ture, have left such sentences in their writings, as may clearly demonstrate the Soul's abilities in this kinde. *Aristotle* in his twelfth Book of *Metaphysics*, saith, That God is *vivens, aternus, & optimus*; living, eternal, and transcendently good: and a little after, That he is *substantia aeterna, immobilis, magnitudinis expers, indivisibilis, infinita, impassibilis & immutabilis, a sensibus separata*. An eternal substance, immoveable, without bulk, indivisible, infinite, not capable of suffering or of alteration, separated from the senses. *Plato* likewise in *Timaeo*, and in his Book *De Legibus*, saith of God, That he is *Genitor Universitatis*,
the

the Begetter of this Universe:
bonum, & causa bonorum om-
nium; good, and the cause of
all good things.

That very Attribute
which Christians do, *ἐξ οὐκ*,
ἐξ οὐκ, after a more special
manner ascribe unto God,
Cicero hath left in his wri-
tings, saying, as we say,
That God is, *καρδιογνώστης*,
the knower of the heart. He
saith in * one place, *Obscu- * 3 De nat.*
rum Deo nihil potest esse: and Deorum.
in * another place, *Ignorare * 2 De Di-*
Deus non potest, quâ quisque vin-
mente sit. The same Au-
thor, by the onely light of
nature, hath contemplated
God in the most happy fru-
ition of himself, as also in
his providence towards
the world, and hath exprest
himself in a most Christian-
like

like manner in both these respects. As touching the fruition of himself, he saith, *Ea est Dei vita, quâ nihil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius cogitari potest: nihil enim*

* Cicero *nullus in-*
tellexit De-
itatem abso-
lute nihil
agere: sed
nostro more
non agere,
sc. cum la-
bore & mo-
lestia.

tari potest: nihil enim * agit,
nullis occupationibus est im-
plicatus, nulla opera molitur:
sua potentia & virtute gau-
det, habet exploratum fore se
semper tum in maximis, tum in
eternis voluptatibus. Such is
the life of God, than which
nothing is more happy, nothing
in the world can possibly be
thought to abound with more
good things: for he doth no-
thing; he is implicated in
no businesses, he undergoeth
no labour, but enjoyeth his
own power and virtue; and
knoweth certainly, that he
shall alwayes be in transcen-
dent

dent and eternal pleasures.
 As concerning God's providence, he saith thus : *In mundo Deus est aliquis, qui regit, qui gubernat, qui cursum astrorum, qui mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservat; terras & maria contemplan, hominum commoda vitasque tuetur.* In the world there is a God which ruleth, governeth, and preserveth the course of the stars, the mutations of times, and the vicissitudes and orders of things; who beholding both Sea and Land, doth defend the goods and lives of men. I could produce a large Catalogue of such-like expressions from the mouths of Heathens: but presuming that what I have already enu-

enumerated, may suffice to vindicate the Soul's Pre-rogative, as touching the knowledge of God in his Attributes; I shall wave all manner of enlargements, and pursue my intended brevity.

To know God in his Attributes, is a near approach to the Deity; yet the rational Soul comes still neerer: first, prying about his essence, then returning to her self, and contriving which way she should know more; at length she saith within her self, *Operatio sequitur esse; action depends upon being.* Then she busies her self in the contemplation of God's actions, which, saith she, are either immanent or transient:

fiest: the immanent actions of God, are such as are perform'd within himself without respect had to the creatures, whereby he is said to know himself, and to love himself; as Scaliger saith, *Deus generat ex seipso, in seipso suisque intellectu- nem, eodem modo, eandem a- qualem sibi.* God doth from himself beget an understanding of himself in himself, after the same manner, the same equal to himself. Here the Soul takes notice of a reflection of the Deity upon it self, and is sublim'd into the supposition of a Trinity: for whereas God doth conceive and know himself, he doth beget a most perfect image of himself, from whence also proceedeth a most per-
D fect

fect love of himself. Now
 seeing there is nothing in
 God, which is not God;
 both the image of God,
 and the love of God seem
 to be distinct * *Hypostases*
 or subsistences of the same
 essence with him from
 whom they do proceed,

* *Vocabu-
 lum Grae-
 cum, ὑπο-
 στασις, mul-
 tisariam ac-
 cipitur; &*

*inter varias ejus acceptiones aliquando sumitur
 pro essentia entis: quo sensu Patres Concilii
 Sardienfis censuerunt, ut est apud Theodore-
 tum in Ecclesiastica Historia, lib. 2. cap. 8.
 unam esse hypostasim Patris, Filii, & Spiritus
 sancti. Verum enim vero ὑπόστασις pro sup-
 posito naturæ intelligentis baud obscuri Au-
 thores accipiunt: quo sensu Græci Patres in
 divina essentia tres hypostases esse asserunt;
 & Dionysius Arcopagita, qui Apostolorum
 coætaneus fuisse perhibetur, in lib. De Cælesti
 Hierarchia, vocat divinam essentiam unitatem,
 τριουμωστασίον, hoc est, in tribus hypostatibus sub-
 sistentem.*

as if an eye should see it
 self: there is first the eye
 seeing; secondly, the eye
 seen,

seen, or at least, the image or species of that eye seen: from which action of seeing, there must necessarily proceed a desire of enjoying; *for every action hath its end.* This comparison of the eye doth in some sort adumbrate the Trinity; yet by shewing how far short the comparison is, the true notion of the Trinity may be more clearly demonstrated. The Eye cannot see it self, but the Deity cannot but behold it self; there being no object beyond it, or extraneous to it. *God doth primarily see and know himself: But secondarily, the creatures, who live, move, and have their being in him.*

The Eye doth not always

D 2 see,

see, but doth in time begin;
and afterwards ceale to
see: but the Deity cannot
but alwayes behold and
know it self; and cannot
but subsist in the eternal
contemplation of it self.

If we should grant that
the eye could see it self; yet
in propriety of speech, we
must deny our supposition;
for the Eye sees not the
naked essence of any thing,
but a certain accident,
viz. the intentional spe-
cies: but the Deity is es-
sentially beheld of it self,
reflecting no other species
or image from it then its
naked essence, whose per-
fection is such, that it can-
not but subsist eternally be-
held and contemplated by
it self.

From

From the reflection of the Eye upon it self, there can proceed onely an appetite of enjoying : but from the reflection of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed an absolute fruition. *Actiones seruntur in bonum*, saith the Philosopher : from the reflection of an eye upon it self, there can onely proceed *bonum desiderii*, a good of desire: but from the reflection of the Deity upon it self, there cannot but proceed *invidia*, or *bonum complacentiae*, a good of complacency. After this manner doth the Soul discourse freely & ingenuously within herself; I mean the rational Soul not clouded with sensuality, nor straight-

ned and girt with prejudice. Then doth she conclude, that there are three necessary distinct subsistences, yet but one essence of the Deity; or that the Deity, which is essentially one, is substantially three. The Deity doth necessarily subsist, first, in the eternal contemplation of it self; secondly, it doth subsist eternally, contemplated by it self; and thirdly, it doth subsist in an eternal complacency of it self: yet are there not three eternals, but one eternal; because the notion we have of eternity excludes plurality: neither do we conceive the first, second, and third subsistence, to be one before
ano-

another in time or duration, because eternity is indivisible, having neither priority nor posteriority; but onely by a priority of order or disposition of their relation. When we say that God is merciful, or that God is just, we speak improperly or *ἀποπροσμίμῃ*, after the manner of men; there being no real distinction betwixt God's mercy and his justice. But when we denominate the Deity to subsist contemplating or contemplated, &c. we speak * properly and absolutely. Where-
** Scientia seu contem-
 platio proprie competit divinae naturae, & improprie tribuitur creaturis: notitia enim nostra est obscura & imperfecta, divina vero est perfecta & absoluta. Multo magis ab aeterno in aeternum scire & contemplari Dei proprium est, quod nullo modo de creaturarum perfectissima predicari potest.*

fore

*Distingun-
tur ab in-
vicem, quia
ad invicem
referuntur.

Ratio enim
formalis re-
lationis est
semper sup-
ponere ali-
ud cui u-
numquodq;
relatorum
referatur.

Quemad-
modum A-
ristoteles,
Πρὸς τὴν δὲ
τὴν πᾶντα

λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἀπὸ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν λέ-
γεται, &c. Et infra subiungit, θαυμάσιον ὅτι
πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν πρὸς ἀνεκτίστον λέγα-
ται.

† Persona est substantia individua, intelli-
gens, incommunicabilis. Hæc definitio a Zan-
chio, lib. 1. De tribus Elohim, & uno Jeho-
va. cap. 2. ex communi Patrum Latinorum
consensu affertur.

fore, although these three
substances be all conce-
trated in the Deity; yet
they are * distinct each one
from the other. In that
they do subst. invisible in
themselves, and really di-
stinct from each other, we
may properly call them
persons: † for a person ac-
cording to Philosophers, is
a rational or intelligible
substance distinct from o-
thers, and indivisible in it-
self.

Hither is the Soul arriv'd,
viz. to the knowledge of
 three persons in one es-
 sence of the Deity; or, to
 the acknowledgement of a
 Trinity in Unity, by the
 consideration of God's im-
 manent actions. Now doth
 she pass from hence, unto
 his transient actions, which
 are the Creation of the
 World, and the preserva-
 tion thereof. Here she
 doth premise, that the
 world was not from eter-
 nity, but did commence
 with time; as also, that
 there could be no first mat-
 ter eternally coexisting
 with the Deity. Moreo-
 ver, she doth presuppose
 that it would be absurd ei-
 ther to affirm or grant that
 the Deity did act positive-
 ly

*Ab absurdum enim esset
 autumari quod
 est, absolutam aterni-
 tatem &
 essendi ne-
 cessitatem
 aliis nisi
 soli Deo
 tribuere.*

ly upon nothing; although before the Creation of the world, there was besides God, privatively, not any thing. There was before the Creation of the world, one onely absolutely necessary infinite Being, *viz.* God, who by reason of his infinity and absolute perfection, could perform no action absolutely transient: neither had he any object besides himself to act upon. Time, and place, or finity might have then been denominated nothing, it being contradistinct to infinity, or a negation of that infinite being, which did onely then exist. Wherefore, time and place before the Creation of the World, could never have been
been

been * conceived or willed * by the Deity ; unless he had conceived and willed himself, together with time and place. So that it seems to the rational Soul, that time and place had its being by the Deities conception and volition of himself, together with time and place ; which was the position of the word of his minde in time and place.

** Nihil non est intelligibili nisi per notionem alterius de quo simpliciter negatur : sed tempus & locus ante creationem mundi nihil erant : Ergo.*

Here is also so clear a Demonstration of the Trinity in the Creation of the world, that it seems impossible to the rational Soul to have the true notion of Creation without the conceit of the Trinity : Insomuch, that the Ancients, who were more

more profound Philosophers, did express the word *create* by an Hebrew word consisting of three Letters, viz. א Aleph, ב Beth, and ג Resch, which signifie the Father, the Son, and the Spirit: which three Letters, by addition of their proper Vowels, either express or understood, are a Verb of the Preter-perfect tense, אברך, signifying, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have joyntly acted, or, they have conspired to act. This word, אברך, *creavit*, doth in it self sufficiently express the action of the Deity, subsisting in a three-fold manner: yet the Ancients go farther, putting to it a word expressing the Deity in the

plu:

Plural Number, saying,
אלהים ברא, *Elohim bara*,
the Gods have created, or
rather, God as he is per-
sonally three hath created.
Hermes a most profound
Rationalist, who was there-
fore called *Trismegistus*, in
his Book intitled *Pimander*,
hath left a sentence to
posterity, relating to the
Creation of the World, as
some do interpret; but
as others do construe it, it
doth only express the Tri-
nity. In this ambiguity,
it is not difficult to decide
the controversie, by affirm-
ing that *Mercurius Trisme-*
gistus did, by one and the
same sentence, primarily
adumbrate the Trinity, and
secondarily the Creation
of the World. For God,
E who

who is himself a pure and most simple act in the eternal contemplation of himself absolutely infinite, doth necessarily contemplate himself, coexisting with the world, or time and place : the World being an inclusion or parenthesis of infinity. The sentence is this : *Monas genuit monadem, & in se summa re-*
flexit ardorem. Thomas understands it to be onely related to the production of the world, supposing it to be analogical to these words of his, viz. *Unus Deus produxit unum mundum propter suiipsius amorem* : but most Philosophers say, that *Hermes* by ratiocination came to the knowledge of the Trinity, and

In I Part
Summa
theolog.
quest. 32.
art. 1.

and exprest it after the a-
foresaid manner. He saith
not, *Monas produxit mona-*
dem; but, *Monas genuit*
monadem. Now the world
may not properly be said
to have been begotten:
for in the Creation of the
World by his will; the
World can in no wise be
called *verbum mentis*, the
Word of his minde; in
that the world being no-
thing, could not have been
conceived in the minde of
God, had not he conceiv'd
himself together with the
World: so that God himself,
being primarily conceiv'd
of himself, is *verbum mentis*
Dei, the word of his own
minde; by whom all things
were made, and without
whom there could nothing
E 2 have

have been made, which was made; who, as he is conceived, is personally distinguished from himself conceiving, although he be essentially the same. The Soul, whose property it is to try all things, and by discourse, either to reduce her superficial conceits into impossibilities, and so pass them by as phantasmes, or else to prove them necessary, and then to retain and embrace them as eternal Truths, doth, by such-like preceding discourse, prove an absolute necessity of the eternal being of one God, whose every action is but one action, and that eternal: in which eternal action, which is also himself, who is *actus purus*, he hath
eter-

eternally subsisted personally three ; in which personal subsistency, he hath eternally created the World.

The Soul having contemplated the World *in fieri*, comes now to take a survey thereof, as it doth exist *in facto esse*.

In this place she doth not consider it, as consisting of such and such parts, or containing such and such particular creatures ; but she onely looks upon it as a finite being, contradistinct to infinity : and first she discourseth the nature of time, defining it, according to common Philosophy, to be *mensura motus Cœli per prius & posterius*. But being jealous, lest

she should impose upon her self, by a paralogism, and so be mistaken in the finding out of that most precious Jewel, which she so earnestly seeks after, *viz.* *Truth*; she rests not contented with this definition, but convinceth herself of the nature of time, by comparing it with Eternity.

Eternity is a duration without either beginning or ending, having neither priority nor posteriority, but indivisible.

Time is a duration having both beginning and ending, and is in it self divisible into priority and posteriority. Time, as time, whether we look upon all time, or the least part-

ti-

ticle thereof, doth consist of these two essential parts, *viz.* the later, and the former; which have their dependence upon a point or moment, in the midst thereof. If then, before all time, there was one onely infinite being, who by the position of his Word in time, caused time to be; the rational Soul collects from hence, together with what is premised, that the Word of God was, in the fulness or midst of all time, to impose a period to the former, and a commencement to the later time; or to constitute the essential parts of time, *viz.* priority and posteriority, by being

being in the midst thereof. And seeing it is that middle point, which doth, by dis-joyning duration, give a being to priority and posteriority; we must necessarily conclude, that the Word of God, which is the second Person in the Trinity, not onely in his eternal essence, but also in his existence, in the fulness of time, was *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ οὐ*, the beginning of the creation of God.

Now the Soul comes to examine the nature of place; which, saith she, is that determinate and circumscrib'd *ubi*, wherein a body is contain'd; which can neither
be

be named, nor rightly understood without the presupposition of a body ; * in-
 somuch, that it is impossible there should be a body which is not in place, as also, that there should be place which doth not contain a body : so that a body and place have a relative convertibility, the one to the other ; and are so mutually reciprocated, that the one being granted, the other is necessarily presupposed.

* *Corpus a Philosophis dicitur esse in loco bifariam, scilicet vel circumscriptive, quatenus ab alio corpore extrinsecus ambiente continetur: vel repletive, quatenus sua mole occupat & replet eorum spatium locale.*

Priori modo quicquid est corporum excepto Caelo supremo, localitatem habet. Posteriori autem modo de omni corpore simpliciter localitas predicatur. Omne enim corpus est, quantum, & quatenus quantum, est extensum in longum, latum, & profundum : & quatenus est extensum, habet certum finem & distantiam partium : ac proinde certum spatium locale replet ac occupat.

The

The Soul from hence collects, that if the Word of God did so exist in place as to give a being thereto; the Word of God did assume a body, which being from eternity conceived in the minde of God, as the onely Idea and platform of the whole creation, must necessarily be of the nature of the perfectest of bodies; which is flesh.

The Soul is now arrived to the incarnation of the Word. The Word, saith she, became flesh and dwelt amongst us; yet in such a Tabernacle as might be the patern of the great Temple, the World, *as also of other living Temples of the Holy Ghost.* Here she conceiveth, that though flesh in the

the general be the perfectest of bodies; yet not any manner of flesh could make a fit Tabernacle for the Word to dwell in, but such onely, as should contain all the variety of the whole world; which is the humane nature.

Here the Soul contemplates the Word incarnate to be *Θεὸς ἁληθινός*, both God and Man, having a perfect humane body, and rational Soul personally united with his Divinity. This personal Union of the divine and humane nature of the Word, must necessarily be the immediate act of God; and consequently, that body which the Word did assume (although, as it was perfectly hu-

humane, it should necessarily consist of flesh and blood, & other such essential parts as do constitute an absolute humane body) could not be produced by generation according to the will of man, having no need of seminality to contribute unto it its plastic or formative virtue; not onely in that it was eternally conceived in the minde of God, as the Idea of the whole Creation; but also, in that it did exist in the fulness of time, which is the beginning of all time, according to the true notion thereof. In this moment or middle point, which gave time a being, which doth divide and couple time with eternity

rity, and doth dis-joyn and
unite priority with poste-
riority, which is in a sever-
al respect, both time and
eternity: I say, in this both
temporal and eternal du-
ration was the light crea-
ted; in this fulness of time,
was the Word incarnated;
which Word incarnate is
both God, and Man; the
image of God; and the
light of Man; and Man is
the image or shadow of that
light.

This at the first view may
seem mysterious and pro-
found: yet after a more
inward scrutiny, it squares
with the humane intellect,
being pure quintessenti-
ated and sublim'd reason:
for time is so included in,
interwoven with, and as it

did F were

were strung upon eternity, that eternity is both the centre and the circumference, the poles and the axle-tree of all time: and according to the notion we have of time, together with its dependence upon, and connexion with eternity; we must necessarily grant some duration to be both time and eternity; wherein we imagine the first act of the Creation to have been performed. Which first act of the Creation, the rational Soul demonstrates to have been the incarnation of the Word, as a cause; and the Creation of light, or the angelical nature, under the notion of an immediate effect: for even as the
Word

Word by existing in time and place did give a being thereto, and by assuming a most compleat and perfect body, which being both elementary, vegetative, sensitive, &c. he did contribute essence to the Elements, Vegetables, living Creatures, &c. even so by the personal union and perfect conjunction of his divine and humane nature, (which personal union is to be considered before the humane nature alone, or those other subordinate natures comprehended in it, viz. sense, vegetation, corporeity) he hath created the Angels, which are a middle nature be-

twixt God and Man : so that the whole Creation seems to be a most perfect Scheme, Image, or Shadow of the Word incarnate ; and all the variety thereof, in each particular, analogically received from his fullness. Although, *quoad nos*, the Word incarnate may seem to be the second *Adam*, who may seem to us to have existed in the world before him; yet *quoad Deum*, he is the beginning of the Creation of God, and the protoplast of mankind, after whose image Man was made. Who by the conjunction of his divine and humane nature, is the Supporter and Bearer of the whole world;

to whom, each Creature
 owes its being; by whom,
 as an efficient cause; by
 whom, as a final cause; and
 by whom, as *ἀντὶ τοῦτο*,
 the world was made; and
 without whom, in each
 of these respects, was not
 any thing made, that was
 made. Who in his di-
 vine nature is ubiquitary;
 and in his humane nature,
 was, in the midst of time
 generally taken, conversant
 in the midst of the then ha-
 bitable world; and in the
 very midst of time strictly
 taken, did, without doubt,
 locally descend, together
 with all the immaterial po-
 wers of the humane nature,
 into the bottom, centre, or
 midst of all circumference;
 which could not be, * ex-

* Si unum
 corpus per
 aliud pene-
 traret, se-
 queretur
 corpus non
 esse corpus,
 sed substan-
 tiam incor-
 poream
 quantitatis
 expertam:
 quod absur-
 dum est, &
 manifestam
 implicat
 contradic-
 tionem.
 Quod ad-
 modum Da-
 masceus
 l. i. Ortho-
 doxe fidei,
 cap. 3. ait,
 Ἀδυνάτον
 ὅτι καὶ δια-
 σπῆται τὸν
 διακονη-
 τικόν &
 λειτουργικόν.

cept he should have put off
 the material and corporeal
 part of his humanity, not re-
 assuming the same until his
 ascent from the infernal pit.
 Now such must necessarily
 have been the * exact *crasis*
 or temperament of that
 most perfect and compleat
 body which the Word did
 assume; that it is conjectu-
 rable, that it might suffer
 and be deprived of its
 form, by solution of conti-
 nuity, rather then from a-
 luisse vi hu-
 mores illius corporis; ut vulnera in exteriori-
 bus infligta mortem non conciliaſſent: ſed in-
 nato corporis balſamo, humoribus, ſc. illis de-
 fluentibus ſanari potuiſſent. Methodum igitur
 iſtā hanc fruſtraneam frangendi oſſa ejus omniſcia
 recusavit providentia. Et ad vulnera quod atti-
 net: previdit, ut non tantum exteriora inflige-
 rentur, ſed ut ipſum cor lancea perfoderetur:
 ita ut ex ipſo corde ſanguis efflueret, & ab ejuſ-
 dem capsula, ſc. pericardio aqua dimanaret.

ny internal principles proceeding from a depraved habit or evil constitution: and being deprived of its form, it is probable it should be incapable of corruption, in that it is impossible it should have been produced by generation.

The Soul is ravished with the contemplation hereof, being not able to express a tythe of what she cannot but conceive: being so oppress'd and overwhelm'd with reason, that she cannot possibly utter her notions herein, except she had cloven tongues to multiply her expressions. For the Word incarnate is that All in All, both of finity and infinity, wherein are all the reasons of things, together

gether with their beings, concentrated : whereby corruption hath a possibility to put on incorruption, and mortality to put on immortality. For, as his being in the world, caused the world to be ; so the perfect conjunction and personal union of his divine and humane nature, which can never be disjoyned, giveth an eternal *precarium esse* to the whole humane nature ; or a possibility to all man-kinde to enjoy an eternal being : yet must the whole world besides necessarily return unto its first nothing, whose existence is but as a *parenthesis* in infinity ; in which *parenthesis* the two extremes, *viz.* Creation and Anni-

Annihilation must necessarily be equally distant from that point in the midst, wherein the Word did exist, to give an absolutely finite being thereto. At the dissolution whereof, it is necessary that the Word incarnate do actually exist in the world, to impose a period thereto (whose commencement did depend upon his actual existence therein) by collecting into himself that scattered light, which is tutelary to the world, which was at first from him dispersed : before whom the whole world must necessarily be collected, together with the angelical nature, which is the next and immediate supporter thereof, and

and must be rolled up as a Book; and then being deprived of its tutelary light, must pass away as a Scheme; the glory whereof shall no sooner be reassumed into the Word, then reflected upon the humane ashes, to revive the same into an incorruptible and eternal being.

After this manner doth the rational Soul ascribe the Creation of the World to God, as the first efficient cause thereof: which one God, she doth demonstrate by reason to have subsisted personally three, in the very act of Creation: but in a more special manner, she doth ascribe the Creation to the Word, which is the second Person in the Trinity,

Trinity, whose actual existence in the world, gave a being thereto. In the contemplation whereof, she cannot but discern with the Eye of Reason, that all those mysteries which the holy Scriptures hold forth unto us, are not at all repugnant to Reason: As, that the Word was incarnated in the fulness of time, having been eternally conceived by the Holy Ghost: that he took upon him the humane nature: that he died by a violent death: that he descended into hell; with many others.

Having found out in the Book of Nature those mysteries which are express'd in the Scriptures, she comes in the next place to observe whe-

whether those things less mysterious in the Scriptures, be not, also written in the Book of Nature. In the holy Scriptures, which are the written Word of God, the Soul conceives herself chiefly concerned, as a rational creature: for there is no other creature in the whole world, except man alone, to whom the Scriptures do properly belong; before whom God hath set the way of good and evil, upon the onely account of rationality; having breath'd into him the breath of life, whereby he became a reasonable Soul: although all other inferior creatures do owe continual praises to God for their being; whereupon, they are

are commanded to observe the Sabbath, which is by God an appointed time of thanks to him for their Creation, wherein he is said to have rested; and is in the course of nature a pause, period, or full stop, wherein most actions do commonly terminate; according to the observation of *Philo Judæus*, *Τὴν φύσιν φιλέουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ καίρῳ.* I say, although all Creatures do owe continual praises to God for their Creation, and do in an obscure manner perform their service therein, having also certain secret Sabbatisms in all their actions; yet man, in a more especial and particular manner hath an Engagement to perform

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an immediate service to
 God, being the worlds
 high Priest, to offer sacri-
 fice not onely for himself,
 but also for all other Crea-
 tures which are subjected
 under him; according to
 that of Mr. George Herbert,
 sometimes Oratour of the
 University of Cambridge :

*Man is the Worlds High
 Priest; he doth present
 The Sacrifice for all, while
 they below
 Unto the Service mutter an
 assent,
 Such as Springs use that fall,
 and Winds that blow.*

Man, who is the High
 Priest of the World, hath
 the Scripture as a Light to
 direct and guide his Soul

to the high - Altar, the Word, *who is also the High Priest of man-kinde.*

Now it is necessary, that there be some proportion betwixt the Light and the Eye ; otherwise the Light would rather dazle and blinde the Eye, then help it in its performance. If the Holy Scripture were not rational, and in some sort proportionable to the humane intellect, it might rather induce incredulity, then enlighten the understanding. Thus doth the Soul discourse. Then doth she attempt by reason, to understand the written Word of God: conceiving it a contradiction, that any thing should be presented, as an adequate object of

the humane intellectuall, not under the notion of rationality.

Herein she first observes the goodly order of the Creation, according to the description of *Moses*, to be much conformable to Reason. As, that the Elements should be created before mixt bodies; and, that out of the Elements there should be procreated all mix'd bodies in such an order and method, as doth correspond the logical *series* in the predicament of substance: that Creatures more perfect should require greater time for their production out of the Earth, then Creatures more imperfect: That first vegetables should be produced

duced, then living Creatures, *viz.* those indued with sense; & last of all Man, who is the most perfect of all living Creatures: and that in the Creation of each *species*, there should be also a gradual ascent answerable to the scale of Nature: as of Animals, first the Fish, then the Fowl, afterwards, the four-footed Beasts: and so of Vegetables, first Grass and Herbs, then Shrubs and Trees. That Man should be at first made up of such matter contained in the Bowels of the Earth, as is the Embryon in the Wombe, *viz.* of red slime, which is analogous to Blood, the thinner parts whereof are, by vertue of its innate heat,

resolved into Spirits ;
whilst the grosser are converted into flesh: and so all the diversity of parts made up answerable to the heterogeneity of the matter.

After the Heaven and the Earth were finished, and all the Host thereof, the Scriptures tell us, That God saw every thing which he had made, and behold it was very good. The very same we read in the Book of Nature. For Reason doth dictate unto us, that all things are good; not onely because every thing in the whole world beareth some proportion or similitude with God, who is the original of its being ; but also because there is no one thing in the

the whole world which is not agreeable and convenient to some other thing. Wherefore seeing that goodness is defined to be the congruity of one thing with another, it follows that every thing in the world is good.

There was no written, positive, or Moral Law given for the space of above two thousand years after the Creation: then afterwards the Law was given by God unto *Moses*, and from him delivered unto the Children of *Israel*. There was reason wherefore the Law should be so long omitted; and afterwards there was reason wherefore it should be then given. Why it was so long
omit.

omitted, may appear by the Contents thereof : for he that reads the Moral Law, and considers all the particulars therein, may observe, that the main scope thereof, was to establish the Children of *Israel* into a Commonwealth ; and to preserve the same Commonwealth, by defending each man's propriety : that so they might, as a peculiar people, comfortably serve the Lord, who had delivered them out of captivity. Now there are three things required to a Commonwealth : first, that there be a competent number of people ; secondly, that this people be entire and free, neither scattered at a distance, nor in-

intermix'd with other people ; and thirdly, that there be propriety of possessions, whereby one man may call something his own which is not another mans. Before the Posterity of *Jacob* had these three Conditions, it was impossible they should be capable of that whole Law which was afterward given unto them. Although, when they were in *Egypt* they did increase, and became numerous ; yet they could have no Law unto themselves, in-regard they were not of themselves a free People, but were strangers in the Land of *Egypt*, and consequently Servants unto the *Egyptians*, who had Task Masters over them, as the
Scri-

Scriptures do inform us.

And afterwards, when they were delivered from the Egyptian slavery, although they were, in the wilderness, not onely numerous, but also a free People, and entire to themselves; yet the whole Law could in no wise belong unto them, because they had no propriety of possessions.

To impose a Curse upon him that should remove his Neighbours Land-mark, would have been nonsense to the Children of *Israel* before they had marked out their Lands, and taken to themselves proper possessions: and so to impose proportionable penalties, if peradventure their Oxen should hurt or
gore

gore one another, or hurt a man; would have been absurd, before they had any Oxen belonging unto them. By this may appear the necessity wherefore the Law was so long omitted.

Now although the Law was written whilst the Children of *Israel* were yet in the Wilderness; yet it could not be in force until their Common-wealth began; but so soon as they had a Common-wealth, they could not possibly be without a Law; for the Law is the Soul thereof, which doth both constitute and preserve the same: whereby their confused multitude was digested into a Re-publick; and their
Re-

Re-publick was continued entire without division or confusion. The multitude indeed might have been continued entire, without so much circumstance of Law, whilst it did subsist as an Army, and was preserved by one common food, *Manna*, which did cost them onely the taking up; yet could it not possibly have subsisted as a Common-wealth, wherein there is propriety of possessions, without the Law, which doth, by defending each mans propriety, preserve the whole Common-wealth in the same state and condition wherein it was first established.

If we look into the Law, we shall finde it to be nothing

thing else but a Systeme of rational precepts, commanding or forbidding upon such proportionable penalties or rewards as are agreeable to the dictate of Nature, or the Law of Reason. Here we have an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, &c. Double restitution is enjoyned for Theft ; and Murther is forbidden upon penalty of Death. And in like manner for Trespases committed, we finde in the Law such rational proceedings, as honest and understanding men would contrive for the due administration of a Common-wealth: as for example: *If men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his*

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first, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: if he rise again, & walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: or else he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.

Exod. 21. 18, 19. If a man shall cause a field or vineyard to be eaten, and shall put in his beast, and shall feed in another man's field; of the best of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard shall he make restitution, Exod. 22. 6. Who can be so ignorant, as not to understand this to be reason?

If we look into other Precepts of the Law, which do not concern any private controversie betwixt man and man, nor are related to the happiness

ness of any particular Commonwealth, but onely to the beatitude of mankind in general; we may observe the like rationality: as for example: *Thou shalt not see thy Brother's Ox nor his Sheep go astray, and hide thy self from them; thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy Brother: and if thy Brother be not nigh unto thee, or if thou know him not, then thou shalt bring it unto thine own house, and it shall be with thee until thy Brother seek after it; and thou shalt restore it to him again. In like manner thou shalt do with his Ass, &c.* Deut 22. 1, 2. *Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him; for ye were strangers in the Land of E-*

fist, and he die not, but keep-
 eth his bed: if he rise again,
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gypt. Ye shall not afflict any widow or fatherless child, Exod. 22. 21, 22. Such-like Sentences of Humanity and Charity, are so sweetly intermix'd with the other precepts of Equity throughout the whole Law, that the Law of Nature, and the Moral Law, seem both to intimate the same thing, and both to be summed up in this rational Precept: *Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris*: Do not thou unto another, that which thou wouldst not have another do unto thee. As concerning those Meats which are forbidden in the Law to be eaten, they are also such, most of them, as even Nature would admonish all people to refrain, of which
sort

sort are Eagles, Ravens, Kites, Hawks, Owls, Bats, Cuckows, &c. and on the contrary, those Meats which are tolerated, are, for certain Physical Reasons, the wholesomest food; and also by natural instinct are suggested unto mankind as elculent: of which sort are the Ox, the Sheep, the Goat, the Hart, the Ro-Back, the Fallow Deer, the Wilde Goat, &c.

Some may object, That if the Moral Law be the same in effect with the Law of Nature, the said Moral Law must necessarily have been observed by other Nations before it was given by *Moses* unto the Children of *Israel*. To which I answer

affirmatively: for it is not hard to prove by Scripture, that almost every punctillo of the same Law, though not as positive but as natural, was observed before it was given unto *Jacob's* Posterity.

Murther was punishable by the Egyptian Laws, as may appear by the second of *Exodus*, where we read that *Moses* looked this way and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew an Egyptian which was smiting an Hebrew, one of his Brethren: and so soon as he had done it, expecting nothing but death, if he had been found out, he hid himself in the sand for his own safety: and afterwards, when *Pharaoh* heard

heard of it, he fled from *Pharaoh*, out of *Egypt*, into the Land of *Midian*, because *Pharaoh* sought after him; being the chief Magistrate to punish such-like offenders.

Adultery was also accounted an offence as heinous before the Law, as it was afterwards; which is manifest by the story of *Abraham* and *Abimelech* in the twentieth of *Genesis*, where we read, That *Abraham* supposing that the fear of God was not in the Land of *Gerar*, denied his Wife: because he knew that Adultery was so odious even in those places where the fear of God was not, that they would rather slay him, and then take

take his Wife, then take his Wife he being alive: they would rather do Murther, then commit Adultery.

Another example we have in *Gen. 39.* of *Joseph*, who would by no means sin against God in committing Adultery with *Potiphar's* Wife: although there was no Moral or Positive Law to make Adultery a sin; but onely the Law of Nature, or the Rule of right Reason.

How severely simple Fornication was punished before the Law, by *Jacob's* two Sons *Simeon* and *Levi*, we may read in the 22 of *Genesis*.

That Theft was made a Crime by the Law of Nature

entire, may be collected out of *Gen. 44.* from the passage of *Joseph* and his Brethren concerning the Cup which was put into *Benjamin's* sack, &c.

Add to all these, *Jacob's* vow of the tenth of all he had unto God, and his obedience to his Father and Mother, which is in the 28 of *Genesis*. By all which it is evident, that the same Law which was afterwards given by *Moses* unto the *Israelites*, had been anciently practised both by the Hebrews and the Egyptians: which was at first written in the Heart of Man, and was con-natural unto him; but, by degrees being obliterated, & in process of time almost wholly

wholly defaced, it was afterwards engraven upon Tables of Stone; whereby it did change its property: being before, the Law of Nature, which did sweetly incline, and was more arbitrary; but afterwards, it became a positive or Moral Law, strictly commanding, and leaving without excuse. Thus much shall suffice to have spoken concerning the Precepts of Holy Writ. I come now in the last place to demonstrate the rationality of Miracles.

A Miracle is an effect produced out of the ordinary course of Nature.

From the notion we have

have of a Miracle, or from its definition, we may collect, that it is not in the power of any Creature to perform a Miracle: for the course of Nature is a Decree gone out from God; which Decree it is impossible that any should have power to alter, but he that made it: so that the exhibition of a Miracle, is a rational demonstration, that he that performs the same is sent of God, and hath his power from above. From the observation of the act, we come to the knowledge of the agent. We say, That to produce such or such an effect, immediately to turn Water into Wine, or the like, is an acti-

action not natural, but supernatural : wherefore the agent cannot possibly be any of the Creatures, but must necessarily be the Creator. Now when the Soul is convinced in Reason, that God is the Agent of Miracles, a Miracle seemeth not strange unto her. For, saith she, He that in the beginning, by hovering upon the Waters, could hatch them into Elements, and afterwards could give power and desire to the Elements to syzgyze and copulate, whereby they did generate all other Creatures: He that without materials could erect so stately a Fabrick as is this Universe, may very well in Reason be

be conceived to be able to perform such-like actions as are recorded in Scripture by the names of Miracles.

By this way of argumentation, which is called Regression, even Miracles do melt into Reason, and do become so familiar to the rational Soul, that when she doth consider the circumstances thereof, *viz.* first, that all Miracles are performed by the Finger of God; and secondly, that there is no Miracle recorded in Scripture which doth imply a contradiction; she ceaseth to admire the same: but wondreth rather, that there should be an Infidel left in the World, or any


I Soul

Soul so dalled with sensuality, or deaded with prejudice, as to lose her Pre-rogative in not discerning the Truths of Christian Religion with the Eye of Reason.



FINIS.





Literato Lectori.



*Interrogas for-
san, Lectorum
Literatissime,
cujus ergo
publicitus e-
derem nanci-
pendulum isthunc De Signa-
turis Tractatulum : quasi
sagacissimos moderni seculi
Medicos lateret quicquid est,
in re Medicâ, aut notatu dig-
num, aut observatu insigne.*

*Nullus equidem eo inficias
versatiores esse nunc dierum
omnes in polydadale Natura
latifundio, quam olim fuisse.*

Imo lubens agnosco nunc
tandem eo culminis evasisse
Artes Scientiasq; : ut, si in
hâc mundi senectute in vivis
superessent qui in Infantiâ ejus
vitam traduxerunt, mira-
rentur valdopere tã tã
inopinis deosideria. pra
omnibus autem, non medio-
cre additamentum sortita est
Medicina, Scientiis, ex quo
cum primis Æsculapius divi
honorem adeptus est tradendo
confusa quaedam, & incerta,
procul methodo, curandi.
Morbos programmata. O
quam, tunc temporis, tenel-
lula, & in cunis vagiens,
Medicina, imposerat peragen-
di ea quæ indies hodie pera-
guntur! plurima Galenus &
Hippocrates habuere com-
perta quæ precedentibus non
nota fuerunt : & multa sa-
puere

puere Successores eorum
que non innotuerunt illis.
Nonnulla nobis patefiunt que
proximum abhinc retrò
seculum latuerunt. Verum
enim verò, non eam adhuc
Medicina tetigit perfectionis
metam, ut ulterius perfici
nequeat: sed, ut sensim &
pedetentim Corpora humana
vacillant indies & labascunt;
ita paulatim nova suppullu-
lant, ad supplendos Naturæ
defectus, &c.

Sic visum est Providentiæ,
cui mortalium neminem pe-
nes est refragari. Omnia
quidem Naturæ sunt οὐχ ἑξο-
υα, sed non nobis omnia.
Circulum sanguinis, novum
illud chyli receptaculum,
ductus lymphaticos, & quic-
quid est istiusmodi; quicquid
casus reperiit, aut ingenium

invenit, antiquitus Natura
tenuit: estò quodlibet Na-
tura munus suo tempore
Mens humana persentiscit.
Ad eundem planè modum
Natura primitus indidit Cor-
poribus simulackra quadam,
non frustra quidem, sed
ut ad vivum depingeret cui
inserviunt usui, & quibus
pollent facultatibus. Na-
tura primitus sanxivit ut
unumquodq; Corpus ageret in
subjectum sibi Naturà proxi-
mum.

Omnia Corpora semper
habuerunt attractricem cum
magnete communem, &
vice versâ. Natura sem-
per fuit ὁμοτεγής; quo
Nomine nunquam non potis
erat indigitandi quomodo
Elixia, quomodo pharmaca,
quomodo venena vires suas
exe-

exerunt: viz. eodem ipsissi-
mo modo, putà similitudine
quâdam substantia inter a-
gens & subjectum.

Hac esse, & semper fuisse,
Natura munera agnoscimus;
horum verò observamen
quantulumcunq; vocamus
nostrum: a quod non inexperti
scripsimus: quare idem
tum Rationis, tum Experi-
entia specillo audaciter credi-
mus.

Ad hanc posteriorem quod
attinet, qua jam prima in lu-
cem prodit, opellam: nemo as-
serat Theologi magis interesse
quam referre nostrâ: Non
enim Rationis extravaga-
mur terminos. Quod si Ra-
tio nostra cum fide coinci-
derit, nihil nobis imputandum
esse speramus. Imò potius
summa sunt agenda D.O.M.

gratia, qui Animam huma-
nam tam splendide orna-
vit & instruxit, ut tam Di-
vina quam humana sapiendi
par esset.

Hoc unicum, *literate Lector,*
perpendas obsecro: sc. *aquē*
absurdum esse Rationem
in hoc, ut damnares, & Ratio-
nem improbandam esse Rati-
one probare. Vale.



E R.





ERRATA.

PAg. 7. l. 1. for *amalgamated*,
read *amalgamates*. p. 10. l. 4.
for *and*, read *that*. p. 24. l. 18. for
acquainted, read *acquainted*. p. 30.
l. 3. for *Senicus*, read *Seincus*.
p. 51. l. 6. for *Gatiopsis*, read *Ga-
liopsis*. p. 60. l. 23. for *Figure from*,
read *Figure proceed from*. p. 61.
l. 1. leave out *Bodies*.

Page 5. l. 8. for *mortum*, read
mortuum. p. 24. l. 20. for *separted*,
read *separated*. p. 25. l. 11. for
raptoyrwices, read *raptoyrwices*.
p. 32. l. 19. (and in other places)
for *then*, read *than*. p. 36. l. 6. for
invisble, read *indivisible*. p. 58.
l. 5. for *assent*, read *ascent*.

